I. INTRODUCTION Throughou t th e Cold War, NATO and its Euro pean m em be rs had a relation ship in which their respecti ve tasks w ere distin ct. NATO was to be respo nsib le fo r th e territorial d efense and mili tary inte gratio n of its m embers, and the various in carn ations of the current Euro pe an Uni on w er e to he responsible for the po litical and econ omi c in tegra tio n of their m embers;' W he n th e Cold Wa r e nde d , th e th reat o f a large-scale att ack o n th e territory of a N ATO membe r state virt ually eva po rated , and wit h it, N ATO's raison d 'clre. Conve rsely, th e EU has been more able to fu rther no nm ilitar y integration amo ng its m e mb ers du e to a shift in th e sec u rity env iro nm ent fro m mil itary to eco no m ic and politi cal secur ity, and th e co m bating o f cr im e rath e r than th e resistance to a possi ble invasio n." W it h sec ur ity becorning based less on " hard ," o r military po w er, and m ore on "soft," o r political and econo m ic power, it app eared th at NATO was no lon ger nee de d to secure th e N orth Atl anti c area.
Europ e and th e imp rov ing mili tary capabilities o f th e E U . Wh ile not alw ays perfect, N ATO and th e EU have created a relati on ship th at allo ws th em to work indepe nd entl y and alongside eac h oth er w he n and if agreellleJlt on suc h co o pe ratio n can be reached . It appe ars th at fo r no w, th e E U ret ains the capability to in dep c ndcn tly co nduc t military o pe rat io ns, ho wev er lim ited in tim e and scope , bur at t he sam e tim e is ready, w illing , an d able to co nd uc t op era tio ns Il1 clo se co operatio n wi t h NATO. Th e recent pro blem s with the d evelo pme nt o f t he Ai rbus A4 00M long-range mi litary transpo rt aircrafi' are also evid en ce not onl y of th e EU 's military capability sho rtfalls, bu t also o f NATO (and o f U n ited Stat es) prim acy in mil itary lo gist ics, w itho ut w hich o peratio ns, espec ially tho se in " o ut-o f-area" thea te rs, are no t possible. NA T O 's relu ctan ce to un derta ke po lice-type op e ratio ns is also of great im po rt . T hu s, th e EU m ust rely on NATO assets to co nd uct large -scale o r high-intensi ty ES O P operatio ns; conversely, NAT O m ust rely 011 t he EU to conduct m ilitarized law enfo rcem ent tasks in are as pre viously un de r N AT O ope ratio nal co nt rol.
II. NATO-EU RELATIONS IN THE 19905 '
C o m pared to today, N ATO and th e European Union had little o fficial co nt act throu g ho ut th e 1990s. T he N ATO -E U m ilitary relationshi p was not a salient topic for disc ussion bet ween NA TO and the E U befo re the end o f the Cold W ar as N ATO W ;l S reco gnized as th e p rimary inr crgo vcn u ucnra l pro vider o f Eu ro pea n sec ur ity . D e velo pments in mi litary pol icy in the E U after th e end o f the Cold Wa r began in ea rne st in 1992, w he n the Western E ur o pe an Unio n (W E U)," th e W este rn Eu ro pe-centered sec ur ity organ ization that w o uld eve nt ually beco me what amo un ted to th e Eur opean U nio n 's military an n , ag reed o n a set o f capabilities that it sho uld be abl e to « Ill up o n as a Europ ean mutu al d efeu se organizati on . T hese capabilities o r " tasks " wer e agreed at ,I meeti ng o f tlie WEU at the Pe te rsb ur g H o tel near BOlin, lead ing to th eir nami ng as the " Pe tersb u rg T asks." T he Petersbu rg T asks include un d ert aking human itarian, peacekeeping, and crisis m ana gem ent missio ns, bu t no t territo rial d efens e, whi ch co nt in ued to be left up to N AT O . The T asks were merged into the Treaty o f Am ste rdam (w hich am ended the EU 's fo un din g tr eaty, the T reaty o f M aastr icht ) in 1997 w hich to ok effec t iJI 1999. T his effec tively m e rged th e W EU w it h th e E U .7 H o wever , befor e thi s m e rger o cc u rred , an agre em ent o n mi litary coo pe ration between N ATO and th e WEU would be co nclude d, the Co m bin ed J o int T ask Fo rce fram ewo rk .
/I.A. THE COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE
T he C ombi ned J oi nt T ask Force fram e wo rk , or CJ T F, was e nvision ed as a wa y and in the end, allo wed the Alliance to resol ve in large part its existential cr isis that had been o ng o ing sin ce the end of the C old War. Its na m e is in reference to a task for ce , or a ternp ora ry mi litary uni t fo rmed for a spe cific purp ose, w hi ch is mounte d Joi ntly ac ro ss m ultiple bran ches o f a m ilitary (army, navy, air force , e tc.}, and w h ich is mad e up o f a co m binatio n o f forces from mu ltiple co u ntries." Origi nated by N AT O 's milita ry co m ma nde r, SA CEU R. ( Sup rem e Allied C o mmand er Eu ro pe) U S Ar my G eneral J oh n Shalikashvili," an d offi cially prop osed in late 199 3 by US Secretary of D efe nse Les Aspin , the CJTF arra nge m e nt w o uld allow NATO m emb er states to un dertake mi litary op eratio ns, usi ng NATO resources, and wi tho ut in vol vin g all N AT O m em be rs. T he m ain idea o f the CJ T F was to pro vid e a fo rma l way fo r sub set s of NATO m embers to co operate m ilitarily th rou gh NATO in a non-Art icle 5 o peratio n, beca use eith er th e thea ter o f o pe ratio ns did not inclu de a NATO m em be r (so http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/8 no A rt icle 5 pr o vision s co uld appl y) I " o r be cau se th e Alli an ce as a w hole co u ld not fo rma lly agr ee o n an und ert akin g, keep in g N A T O fro m act ing at all. J 1 A n exa m ple of probl em s o f this sort f,lced b y NATO in t he 19YOs w e re the di sagreem e nts am o ng the Un ite d State s, the United Ki ngdom , an d Fra nce rega rdi ng th e fo rmer Y ugos lavia prior to NATO's eventual Interventi on in A ugust 1995 in Bosnia . Various p rop osals h ad been put fo rw ard regarding a NATO inte rve nt ion b efore th is tim e , but iuability to reach an ngreeme nr o n th e proper method (airstri kes, g ro u nd o pe ratio n , etc .) kept any plans from m o vi ng forw ard , III addition to "paral yzin g" th e N o rth Atlanti c C o u ncil and severely ham pe ring its ability to ca rry o u t the da y-to-d ay o pe ratio ns o f th e Alli anc e ."
Th e pro posal of th e CJ T F w as an ackno wl ed ge m ent o f se veral facts: fir st, that NATO's m a in purpose was 110 longer its o nl y important o ne, th at is, th e co llec tive territorial defense o f m em be r states. Seco nd, it ack n o wled ged th at NATO w as a useful and appro priate bod y to co nd uct sm alle r-scale peacek eeping-typ e o pe ratio ns that m ay no t h ave in te reste d o r h ad an im pac t o n all m embe rs, and third , th at th e re exis ted no n-stat e o r int rastat e threats to transatlantic secur ity. O ne of th e pr obl ems befo re th e crea tio n of the CJ T F, and o ne that it was in P~l rt m ean t to solve , is that large parts o f t he m ilitar y capab ilities o f so m e m ember s we re always e nvisio ned to be d raw n from NATO , so para lle l capabilities we re ne ver d eve lo p ed or we re not de ve lope d to th e po int w he re an indi vid ua l u iem ber w o uld be able to ac t full y indep e nde nt ly if it so chose (exce pting, o f co urse , th e U nited Sta tes an d to a le sse r ex te nt th e United Kin gdom and Fr an ce). It was the case th at if, for ex am ple . so m e E u ropean NATO m em ber s w ished to undertake a peacekeepi ng o pe rat io n, th er e w as no me chanism for t hem to have re course to NATO asset s whic h, if giv e n, w o uld have enabled th em to un d ertak e th e o pe ratio n . This problem w as ex ace rba te d b y th e tw o f.lctS that all NATO m e m ber states mu st agree on any de cision to use (o r, in th is e lse, provide for the use of) force , and th at th er e are NATO m ember state s w ho w ert' no t members of the European U ni on and were the refo re not cove red by th e d efen se ca pab ilities o f the WEU.
The cre atio n of the CJT F represent ed a m ajor sh ift in Al liance policy which througho ut th e Cold W ar had be e n th at N ATO sho uld ac t un ani m o usly o r no t at all. ':' The rem o val o f t he need for un animous All ied ac tio n (but no t of un anim ou s All ied approval) 111 th e CJTF frame w o rk appe ared to cr eate th e p ossibility th at NAT O asse ts co uld be used by th e W EU to th e det rim en t o f a NATO m ember state as the tw o o rga n izatio ns' mem be rshi p ro lls we re no t perfectl y overlap ping. Th is co nc ern was eve nt ua lly resol ved in ag ree m e n ts co ncl ude d in t he ea rly 2000s, as d escrib ed bel o w .
1I.A.l. CJTF Development: Different Directions
It is possible to divid e th e d iscussion 0 11 the po ssibility o f <I CJT F frame w o rk into three cam ps: Atla uticists, led by th e U S and the UK, Europcanists, led by Fran ce, and Euroat lanticists, led by G ermany." Argum ents put fo rt h in stro ng favo r o f a CJ T F fram e w o rk were state d by AI/anl;eisl countries. Th ey still saw N ATO as th e pri m ary sec ur ity organ izati o n in Eu ro pe , and th eir support for th e CJTF wa s vie w ed b y so m e as a "preempti ve stri ke " aga inst a bu rgeo n ing European Security and D efe nse Identity (ES D J)'S and a more ind ep en den t WEU . In their view, <In indepe nd e nt ESD I and W EU w o uld violate the principle of " sep arab le bu t not se paratc ,"! " a goa l stat ed in the un ani m ously-approved declaration re leased afte r the 1994 NAT O H eads of St ate and Governme nt m eeting. This id ea intend ed tha t th ere sho uld be an indep ende n t E uro pea n (W E U) capab ility to act m ilitarily, an d th at th ese cap abilities co uld include th e use o f N AT O asset s, but t hat th e y sho uld no t be pe rm an e ntly separate from capabilities already possessed by NATO. Th e o nly W~l Y for that to happen, of co urse , would hav e b een for th e WEU to budd duplicati ve perman ent structures for their o w n use , w h ich is exactly what th e Atlantitist states w er e tr yin g to avo id ."
The Europcanist vie w is simpl e to expla in : the WEU sho uld be able to act co m p le tely independ ently without any outsid e assistanc e o r intervention. This w ould obvi ou sly requIre duplicati on o f ex isting NATO assets and capabilities. Fran ce , a lon gtime critic of th e "organi z.uionul " part o f NATO, led thi s vie w and co nt in ued to block pro gress o n develo pme nt o f the CJ T F until, facing drasti c cuts in d efense spend ing at hom e and am on g o the r WEU allies, it realized it could no lon ger realistically suppo rt th e development of stru ctures and assets complet ely sep arat e from NATO . ' 8 Euroatlanticist states were int er ested in an ex pansio n of both NATO and WEU cap abiliti es and were initially uncommitted to a single proposal.
The structure of a CJ T F was [ Iidy straightforward , but the de vel opment of its st ructure was mired in controv ersy. In gen eral, offic ers participating in a CJTF would be assigned to a NATO installati o n as part o f a CJ T F "nucleus," and w ould be "dual-hatted ," th at is, th ey w ould at o nce be ser vi ng as o ffice rs o f th e NATO installati on to whi ch the y we re assigne d and as officers in th e CJ T F chain o f comm and. !" The political and military cha ins o f command w er e so m e of the most controversial elem e nts of th e CJTF frame w o rk. France for its part resisted th e Am er ican noti on th at a CJTF would be ultimately be led by th e SAC E U R, always an American , and wanted to set up a separate chain o f command and polic y bod y that w ould ove rsee CJ T F depl o ym ents. Th e "s epara ble but no t separate" argum ent wa s again used by the U S III its oppo sition to cre atio n of n ew politi cal and military command structu res, w hich wo uld allow th e US to rem ain inv ol ved III ev ery d ecision to usc NATO resources, eve n if it ultimatel y chose not to participate in the o pe ratio n at all. The U S pr oposal wa s to set up co m m ittees w ith in th e ex isting N orth Atlanti c Co u ncil ro ove rsee crisis managem ent and pea cekeepin g policy. Tlii s particular di sagreem ent stalled p ro gress on th e CJTF fram ework for ov er two yea rs.:" Follo wing Fran ce 's de cision to mo ve closer to th e Allian ce in mid -J 9~5. an agreement o n th e CJTF m oved clo ser to compl eti on. E ventually, Fran ce wa s th e o nly m ajor player rem aining III the Europeanist camp, w it h both th e UK and Ge rm any su ppo rting th e U S visio n o f the CJ T F.cI As th e co m p letio n o f th e agree m en t neared, howev er , Chai rman of th e J oint C h iefs o f Staff G en eral John Shalikashv ili o bje cted to the ent ire proposal as h e was co nce rn ed th at th ere wa s a possibility that Fran ce wo uld, in a CJ T F. direc tly control operati on s involving US forc es. His objecti on s did not sto p the Un ired States from proceedin g wi th th e plan '"" Finall y, th e U S made a major co nces sio n to m ove th e ag reem en t to a co nclusio n: it dropped its in sisten ce o n CJ T F com m and being part o f th e ex isting integrat ed military co m m and, that is, it no lon ger insisted th at the SACEUR. w ould be parr of th e chain of co m m and . It accepted the pos sibility of CJ T Fs being co m m ande d from nat ion al military headquart er s. provid ed they ad hered to NATO stand ards and regulations. This rem o ved the fin al stu m b ling blo ck to th e CJ T F agr ee me n t.
In Berlin in J un e l C)~6 , NATO foreign ministe rs sig ne d a formal agreeme nt o n the CJTF. This agre em ent would permit th e WEU to use US airlift (as th e U S w as th e m ajor provid er of NATO airlift ca pability) , co m m u nica t io n, and satellite intelligence cap abihties, as we ll as NATO airb orn e early warning aircra ft during CJ T F mi ssion s. The Alli an ce would have to unanimously agree on the co nd itions o f the release of its assets. Th e phrase "sepa rabl e but not separate military capabilities" w as part o f th e Final Co mm un ique of the Berlin m eeting , sh o w ing the influ en ce of th e Atlanticist view on th e agreem ent. and http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/8 NATO's Assistant Se cretary-G e neral for Defen se Plann ing .m d Po lic y, a ke y m ilit ary cap;lbilities plann e r in the NATO poli tical hierarchy , ad m itted that th e CJ T F frame w o rk w o uld avo id t he cr eatio n of "unn ecessary, separate capab ilit ies" ." Successful exe rc ises of the CJ T F syste m we re ca rried o ut in 19 97 a nd 1SJ l)i\. Whil e the Berli n ag reelll ellt, w h ich would le nd its nam e to th e Liter " Be rlin Plu s" series of ag ree ments. esta blished the m embe rs' w il ling ness to pr o vide for CJ T F mi ssio ns, argume nts ab o ut u ltim ate political an d m ilitary co nt ro l ove r a possibl e CJ T F co ntin ued at var ying degrees of int en sity until th e co ncl usio n of th e Be rlin Plus agr eements In 2002.
As envisioned III th e Jun e 1\)96 Berlin conunnni que, the CJ TF fra me w o rk had th ree poss ible o pe ratio n ty pes . First , th e re co uld be a " N AT O -o nl y" CJ T F w it h a subs et of Allian ce m embe rs parti cipatin g and usin g Alli an ce asse ts. Seco nd , there co uld be a "N AT Oplu s" CJ T F wi th so me Alli an ce m embers parti cipating alo ngs ide Partne rship for Peace 2 1 states, usin g Allian ce asset s. Th e cr eation o f a st ruc tur e to allo w uon -NATO co u ntries to contribute to and co o pe rate militarily with N A T O w as ano the r impo rta n t fun ct ion o f th e CJTF fram ew ork . Last, th er e co uld be a "WE U-l ed CJTF" wh er e the WEU wo uld use ,I NATO head qu art ers and Alli an ce assets to co nd uc t its operati on .P This final possibility wa s th e closest e q uivale nt to what wo uld lat e r becom e th e cent ral point o f the Berlin Pl us ag reem e nts. Fu rt he rmo re , this possibility wo u ld allo w th e W E U to use US a irlift capabiliti es as assigne d to NATO , m ateri ally in vol vi ng th e United States w he ther it w ishe d to contribute nati onal asset s o r n ot, beyo nd th ose alread y assig ned to N ATO (suc h as gro u nd troops, arm ored vehicles, etc ) . D espite the po ssibility that thi s ar ra ngeme nt could requ ir e a sign ificant co m m in u en t of resources by th e U n ite d States, it was not see n as a p ro blem. As a US A mbassador to N A T O put it , 2(, This q uote also bri ngs up th e fact that in effect, th e Un ite d States w o uld hav e multiple reasons to veto a pot ential W EU-Jed CJ T F o pera tio n . The US, of co ur se , p ossesses a veto ove r an y CJ T F op era tio n, as do all NAT O m embe rs, h u t th e sig nifican t and uniqu e commitm ent by the United Sta te s to an y CJTF o pe rat io n, w he t he r o r not it co nt rib uted any soldie rs, o ffice rs, or other m at er iel, llIay cr eat e add itio nal conce rns o n the part of the US . If, for example, it w as ind ep end e ntl y engaged in ano th er military o pe ratio n when a requ est for a WEU -Ied CJ T F cam e to th e N orth Atl anti c C o u ncil, perhap s it mi ght ha ve a utho rized th e CJT F but fo r its pr eexi stin g need for all o f its airlift capacity to sup po rt its o ngoing ind epe nd e nt o pe ratio n.
T his question of th e existe nce of a NA TO veto ove r a pote ntial WE U o pe ratio n would become far m o re salie n t as the military capabilitie s o f th e WEU (and, ev ent ually , th e EU ) im p ro ved . Thi s ve to has often bee n de sc ribed as a " rig ht of fIrSt re fusal ," w h ic h , if ex iste nt , wo uld requi re th at any W E U o r EU mission be fi rst br ought to NA T O for the co nside ratio n of a " N AT O -o nly " o per at ion , w hi c h , if refu sed , co uld th en p ossibl y co nt in ue as a \VE U-o r E U -Ied o pera tio n w ith possibl e recourse to NATO asse ts. T his is n ot a " rig ht o f first refusal." as w o uld becom e th e ten n o f art in th e co ntext of th e B erlin Plu s arra ngem ents. T he difference betwee n the peri o d preceding the cre atio n o f th e CJ T F m ec han ism and following th at. th e period pr eceding the co n clusio n of th e Be rlin Plus ag reements, is th at durin g th e forme r. the cap ab ilities avail abl e to th e ESDI were rather limited , Thus there was no " first" refu sal to be made , ;\ S th e WEU (or EU) W~IS un able to undertake~lll Y typ e o f sig ni ficant pea cekeep in g o r cr isis m uu agem en t ope ratio n w itho ut NATO assets. It wo uld be accu rate to des crib e NATO's right, as of the conclusio n of th e CJ T F ag ree men t. as a " rig ht o f refu sal," sin ce a refusal by NATO to allow access to Alli an ce assets w ould effectively pr e vent the WEU from mounting an y operati on whatso eve r. As th e ESDI rransformcd into th e European Secu rity and D efen se Poli c y, a subpart o f th e Com mon Foreign and Security Poli cy (C FS P) , and th e EU slowly acquired th e ability to co nd uct independent o pe rn rio ns with out NATO assets, the qu estion o f a right o f "first" refu sal becom e central to t he discu ssio n o f any NATO-EU cooperati on.
II.B. NATO-EU MILITARY RELATIONS POST-CJTF
The successful im ple me n tatio n of th e Petersburg Tasks und er th e aegis o f th e EU a nd n ot o f the WE U wa s only po ssible after th e co nclusio n o f th e 199 R Anglo-Fren ch Saint-M alo sun un it wh erein the UK and France agr eed that the "[Eu rop ean] Uni on mu st have th e capacity for au ton om ous acti on , hac ked up by c red ible military forces, th e m eans to decid e to USf th em , a nd a readiness to d o so, in o rde r to respond to int erna tio nal crises.'?" This w as a sea c ha nge ill th e European positi on o n defen se matters. as disagr eements between the UK an d France had held up significant progrf ss on C FSP since th e c reatio n o f th e C FSP pillar o f th e EU in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastri cht . The United States respond ed in suppo rt of th e n e w ESOP initi ative, with th e caveats of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's "3 O s:" no d ecoupling from NATO, n o d uplica tio n o f ex isting NA T O resources, and no discrimination aga in st n on-EU NATO m embers (most sig nificantly, th e U S, Ca nada, and Turke y) in EU -NATO cooperative ope ratio ns . Th ese we re co nd itions that th e U S m aintained until at least 200X 2 ' NATO ackn owl edged the Saint -M alo declaration at its 1999 W ashin gton Su mm it. and stated that it was immediately prepared to offer th e EU "assu red " (perman ent) access to NATO planning ca pabi lities, but th at it wo uld reser ve decisions o n EU acce ss to NATO assets (aircraft. intelli gen ce , com m u nica tio ns, erc .) o n a case-by-case basis 2 9 Finally, in late 19')') at th e European C o u nci l Sum mi t in Helsinki , th e Co unc il decide d upon th e" H elsinki H eadlin e Goal." Th is was a seri es o f military capa bility target s to h e reached by 2003 that w er e n eeded by th e EU to carry o ut the' Petersburg Tasks, which it had assig ne d itself in th e Treaty of Amsterd am. ": Th e H elsinki Summit also marked th e turning point in NATO-EU milita ry relati on s [rom the CJ T F to wards th e Be rlin Plu s agr eem ents. Pri o r to th e Summit, all militar y ope ratio ns conduct ed under E SOP we re dep endent o n the EU 's in stitutional conn ection to th e WEU , whi ch in turn was potentially depend ent o n borrow ed NATO assets w hi ch could be rev o ked at an y time by a loss o f co nse nsus in the N orth A tlanti c Council ." Foll owing th e H elsinki Sum mit, the EU g rad ua lly began to tak e over coope ratio n with N ATO froiu th e \VEU so th at th e lin k to N ATO assets w e n t di rec tly to th e E U rather th an th rou gh an intermediary o rga nizat io n . Thi s c hange thu s direc tly foresh ad o w ed the e ve ntua l Berlin Plu s ag ree me nts, NATO , for its pa rt, subseque ntly stated its gen eral agreem ent with the EU plan s stated at th e Helsinki Sum m it."
At till s point , we ha ve see n that th er e w as the political will to hav e the capability to undertake military acti on o n th e part of th e European U nio n, and a distinct lack of an d desire fo r th e capability itself. The de velopm ent o f ESOP as part o f C FS P co nt in ue d into th e twenty-first ce ntur y w ith th e appoi ntm ent of a form er NATO Secre tary-G e ne ral, J ahttp://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/8 vier Solana , as th e EU 's H igh R epresent ative fo r C FSP and as th e Sec rctarv-C e ue ral of th e WEU. Mr. Sala m 's uniqu e insight s Into NATO 's o rgan ization . in add itio n to his tenure as Secreta ry-G eneral dunn g t he establishm ent o f th e CJTF m ech an ism, lent credihility and add ed efficie n cy to th e EU 's am bitio ns for coope ratio n with th e Alliance, and NATO, during th e s.uu e peri o d , undert o o k mi ssion s ill Bosnia and H erzego vina (SFOR) an d the for me r Yu goslav R epubli c o f M aced onia (O pera tio ns Esscntiat H arvest, A tnbe, F ox, and A/-lied H am loll ) '.) As ESDP d evelop ed , ho w eve r, co op eratio n bet ween th e NATO and th e EU became hogged down in Allian ce politi cs. T h e develo pme nt o f the Berlin Plu s agr eeme nts were not immune to this pr oblem.
III. DIRECT NATO-EU COOPERATION: THE BERLIN PLUS AGREEMENTS

III.A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGREEMENTS
Th e Berlin Plus agr eem ents, wh ose nam e refers to th e 1<)96 Be rlin accord that set up the CJTF m echanism, gr ew directly out of th e co nclusio ns of th e 1991) Wa shin gt on Summit whi ch affin lled NATO 's w illingness to d evelop a system by which the EU co uld use Alli an ce assets. Until th at point, th e EU had reco urse to Allia nce assets onlv throu gh the WEU , and such recourse was d ep endent o n co n tinue d un animou s co nse nt am on g NATO m em bers. The June 19<) <) Cologne European C o u ncil m eeti ng established th e EU po siti on on form al arra ngem e nts d irec tly between the E U and N ATO : that ce rtai n " capabilities and comm on asse ts" should be "pre-identifi ed" fo r a "presumption of availabili ty " to th e EU, and access to NATO pl ann in g capabiliti es sho uld he "assured, " but that th e release of Allian ce asse ts sho uld be ultimat ely decid ed "o n a case-by-c ase basis." 33 ThIS wa s a cautio us position . It did not call for a signific ant c ha nge in th e ex isti ng arrange me n ts betwee n the WE U and NATO, o n ly th at NATO sho uld deal directl y wi th th e EU rath er th an th rou gh an intermed iary, the W E U . A more .uubiti ou s stance o n th e part of th e EU , perh aps m o re In lin e with the Europcanist view, might have included calls for co ncre te guarantees of NATO asset availability o r for a specific list of assets to be " pre-iden tified ." The fact that the EU di d not ad opt su ch a position, w he n it was w ell within its rights to d o so , shows its nom inal acq u iesce nc e to a m ore A tlanticist vie w that sig nificant EU assets sho uld not be separate, noruina llv or o t he rw ise, from th ose of NATO . At th is point, howe ve r, Alliance politi cs bega n to slo w do wn th e negotiati on s.
In b tl' 1<)<)<), Turkey became con cern ed that an E U -o llly forc e w ith recourse to NATO assets might pr ejudi ce its Interests in C ypru s. This was d ue to the fact that Turkey, a non -E U N AT O mem ber , had and still has a dispute over th e island of Cypru s w ith Greece , a m ember of hath NATO and th e E U . .Ii It wou ld seem at first g lance th at th e EU wo uld he more intereste d in d efen d ing th e int erests o f its o w n membe rs rath er th an th ose of NATOth e conclu sion of th e Berlin Plu s agreem e n ts.
Littl e pro gr ess o n e n hancing NATO -E U co o peratio n was n inde in 2000 and 2001 du e to a vari ety o f fac to rs, incl udi ng th e c hanging U S ad m inistratio ns and th e Se p te mber 11 atta cks an d N ATO 's first -e ve r A rti cle 5 o pe ration in respo nse. H o w e ve r, by 2002, the European Coun cil felt it cou ld successfully mount a m ilitary op era tio n with acc ess to NATO assets, and offe re d to take over peacekeepin g in th e former Y ugoslav R epu blic of M aced on ia (FY R O M ) from NATO, o n th e co nd itio n th at the Berli n Plu s agreeme nt wa s co ncl ud ed bcforc ha ud" E ven ea rlier, in 200 1, th e EU Special R ep resentati ve had o pe n ly proposed an EU take o ver of op e rations 1Il FY R.O M, bur this W~l S j udged b y bo th N ATO and th e EU to be p renl :ltUre . ' 
The ur gen cy of ag ree ing a successo r to th e 199() Be rlin agree me nt be cam e clea rer , wi th th e E U taki ng official and o pe n opposition to Turkey's stance w hi ch at that po int co nt in ue d to lock LIp an y progress in the N o rth Atlanti c C o uncil o n Be rlin Plus. The issue o f an E U takeo ver of peacekee ping in FYR OM becam e so i m po rta n t to the EU that France and B elgiu m j ointl y co nsid e red , but ultimat el y decid ed aga inst, an in dep enden t mil itary oper atio n there that w o uld be wi th o ut any re course to NA TO asset s.:" NATO 's positi on wa s that th e " pa rt ic ip atio n issue," th at is, the di fferences bet ween NATO and E U m embershi p, was th e linc hp in in th e B erlin Pl us negori arion s.:" E ventu ally, pr o g ress be cam e so bogged d o wn th at th e EU wa s force d to take an offic ial position o n the issue . It stated th at E SOP wo uld " und er no c ircumsta nces be use d again st a]n] lNAT O] AUy," w ith th e stated assumption of a reciprocal p ro mi se by N AT O to not use Alli ance assets aga iIlS t an y EU m ember, NATO m emb er or not. The EU fur t he r stated th at C yp rus, w h ic h wa s slate d to and eve ntua lly did become an E U memb e r in 2004, wo uld not parti cip ate in E SD P o peratio ns . '''.11 T his, co m b in ed w ith Greece so ften ing its sta nc e o n pote nti al Turki sh E U mem be rship, led to Turke y dro pping its o bj ect io ns in the N orth Atlanti c C o u ncil. This e piso d e clea rly shows th e lin kage be tween NATO and EU politi cs n ot o n ly in ge nera l, b ut also bet w een th e spec ific areas of military coope ra tio n and genera l EU for eig n policy.
III.B. THE BERLIN PLUS AGREEMENTS: AGREEMENT, IMPLEMENTATION, AND OPERATION
B arel y in time fo r th e March 3 1, 2003 laun ch o f th e E SO P mi ssion Ope ratio n CO IIcordia, and just th ree days befo re th e U S in vasio n of Iraq, th e B e rli n Plus agreem ents ca me into fo rce o n th e l Zth of that m onth aft e r an exc hange of letters bet w een CFS P High R e presentati ve Sola na and N ATO Secreta ry-G e n e ral Lord R obertso n . AJ] but one of the individ ua l Jg ree me n ts had been fin alized in lat e 2002 , but U S in sisten ce th at all pa rts, in clu di ng the key Se cu rity of l nfo rma rio n ag ree m e nt tha t covered th e han d ling of classified N ATO docu m ents by th e EU, should be finaliz ed befo re th e e nt ire pa cka ge could COll ie into force de layed the fin al da te so mewhat ." Th e U S w as no t likely try in g to derail th e agreement, but attem p ting to ensure th e sec ur ity o f its classified informa tio n . a lar ge vo lu me of wh ic h it m akes available to N ATO allies , the UK in pa rti cul ar .":' Th e Berlin PJus agre em ents are a series of separa te acc ords reached b et ween NATO and the E uro pea n U nio n on Decem b er 1n, 2002 (again , no t fina lized u ntil March 17 of t he followi ng ye ar) , and co nce rn seve n m ajor a rea s of coope ratio n, accord ing to SHA PE (Suprem e Head q uarters Alli ed Powe rs Europe, NA TO's m ilit ary headq uarte rs) : Capabiliti es 5. Terms Of R eference for DSA CEU R and European Coi u um nd Options for NATO (I. EU-N AT O co nsult.u io n arrangem e nt s in th e conte xt of all EU-l ed CMO making use of NATU asset s and cap abiliti es 7 . Arra nge m e nts fo r co he ren t a nd mutually reinforcin g Ca pability R e q ui re me nts"
The actu al text o f th ese .rgree m cn ts is classified , and so un fo rtunatel y is un availabl e for analysis. It is p ossibl e only to interpret th e state me nts and pu blic decisio ns m ad e by vario us act o rs in order to d eterm ine the structure and fun ction of the agr eem ents. A key do cum ent to co nside r IJl such an analysis is the D ecembe r 2002 "EU-NATO D ecl aratio n on ESOP ." D esp ite its lack of spec ifics. it provid es an o utline o f the Berlin Plu s agree me n ts and a COI11 -m on o pinio n o n thei r purp ose and fun cti on o n th e part o f NATO and the E U . In the do cum ent, th er e is reco gnition th at N ATO .md th e E U are " o rga nizatio ns of a differ ent nature," and cond uct " crisis manageiu eur act ivi ties. . . [whi ch] are mutually rein forcin g ," w hic h in co ntex t is like ly refer ring to th e strictly mi litar y and milirary-ci viliuu coo pera tive nature , respectively, of the o rganizatio ns. It also sta tes th at th ere shall be " eq uality a nd du e regard for decision-makin g auto n o m y ... of th e E ur opea n U nion an d N ATO ," w hic h impl ies no rights of veto o ver or involvement III th e decision-making pr o cess o f th e o the r for eith e r o rganizatio n. T he d o cum ent then addresses th e ov e rlapping m embe rship of the two organizario ns hy stating th at " t he European U ni on is ens u rin g th e full est possible involvement o f non-EU E u ro pea n m embers o f NATO w ithin ESO P," w h ich ex cludes th e US and Canad a but includes Turk e y. Finall y. it contain s lan gua ge th at allows th e EU irr e vo cabl e acc ess to NATO plann ing fac ilities, but th at all o the r asse ts a nd capabi lities w ill be m ad e ava ilable o n J case-by-case basis. Th e doc um e n t and th e agree m ents d o not o bv io usly in clud e reference to an imp ortant co ncept to consid e r, w h ich is one of th e m ost co nt rove rsial areas in NATO-EU military relations: the " right o f first refusal. "< 5
II/.B.l. The Right of First Refusal: Differing Positions on NATO Primacy
T o expla in th e right o f first refu sal, o ne ca n cr ea te a hvporh ct ical situ atio n where th er e ex ists a problem in a European co u ntry, n o t a m em be r o f NA T O o r o f th e EU , but perh aps lo oking towa rds m embe rship in eit he r o rga nizatio n in th e future. It is decided b y th e EU that a peacek ee ping o pe ratio n wo uld be necessa ry and helpful to th e situ atio n . If N ATO in fact has a stric tly defi ne d right o f first refusal, th e EU wo u ld he o bligate d to ask if NAT O wished to un dertake an operation 111 th at are a. If the an sw er were negati ve . th e E U co uld proceed Ind ep en d entl y or with an op e rat ion under Berlin Plus. If th e answ er were positi ve . NATO wo uld be o bligated to und ert ake th e o pera tio n and the EU wo uld not be inv ol ved mi litari ly ;IS an o rga n izatio n . C on versel y, if NATO does not have a right of fmt refu sal, th e EU wo uld n ot be o bligated to ask NA T O if it had an inter est i n an o peratio n , and co uld p ro ce ed directl y to undertaking it itself o r ask ing fo r recourse' to N ATO assets und er Berli n Plu s.
If such a rig ht ex ists, it wo uld see m to im ply th at NA T O co uld indefinitel y hold lip an operati on pr opo sed by the EU that w ou ld use o nly EU assets, by co nt in uo usly d iscu ssing NATO, the European Union, and European Defense After Cold War the d esire o n the part o f NA TO to undertake th e ope ratio n . As we will see, thi s do cs not app ear to he th e case. The Berlin Plus ag ree me n ts d o not by all acco u nts co ntain ,lny refe rence to a rig ht of first refusal; t hu s it rem ains un clear w hether o r not N ATO po ssesses such a right. Fro m sta tem ents mad e by NATO. th e EU . an d NATO mem be r states, it is clear that th er e are differing evaluations of th e existen ce o f the right .
Th e Uni ted States has argned since at least 1992 that NAT O is th e "prefer red institutio n to act , w her e ve r po ssible ," and th at it re co gnizes that th e Allian ce " mi g ht no t act," w he re u po n " [t he US] agr ee d to m .ike N ATO assets availab le to the Euro pea n Un io n." ", Thi s appe ars to be no t o nly an assertio n th at NA TO does ind eed possess th e rig ht of first refusal, hut also a virt ual guarantee, as abo ve and stated later III 1995 by US Am bassado r to N ATO R ob ert H u nt er, of NA T O assets for ,HI EU (or WEU) o pe ratio n . At var io us points. the U S Co ng ress has also d emand ed the righ t o f first refusal be acco rde d to N AT O III w riting by the E U .<7 Th e E U , ho wever contin ually asse rts its "dec isio n-making au to n ollly ,"<K th o ugh this seem s to be pa rtially co ntrad icted b y the und ispu ted fact that un der both th e CJ T F mechani sm and Berlin Plu s, NATO wo uld have to un au iruou sly agr ee to release its assets to a W E U o r EU mi ssio n. Th e EU of co urse states its right to auton or u ously condu ct ESO P mil itary o pe ratio ns <IS its sees fit , bu t w itho ut absolutely guarant ee d reco urse to N ATO asse ts, its o ptio ns are m o re luuired , as we w ill see belo w .
Ju st before the fin al co nclusio n of th e Berl in Plus agr eem e nts, th e " E U -N AT O D eclaratio n o n ESO P " was agreed by th e E U and NA TO , w h ich stated th at t he EU sho uld have t he ahility to cond uct o pe rations whe re "the allian ce as a wh o le is not en gaged. "' 9 A lite ral readin g of th is state me nt wo uld see m to indi cat e tha t the EU canno t operat e w he re NATO is already o per ating as an allian ce. Th is interpretation is not d isput ed by eith e r NA TO o r the E U .;< ' T he U ni ted States , ho w ever, and fu rrh crmorc. th e N ATO Sec rerary-Ge ueral, have stated their in terp ret ations of the state m en t as "w he re th e alliance as a wh ol e chooses no t to be engaged ," \1 and that "the EU w ill only co nsid er undertakin g oper ations w her e NATO as a w ho le has d ecided not to be engaged ," respec tively, and indicating o fficial NATO ag ree me nt w ith th e more restrictive (in the view o f th e EU) int erp ret atio n . The offi cial int erp retation by the Secre tary-C e ncra l may be even more rest ricti ve, as it states , in effect, th at th e EU lllay not even officially co nsid e r I n o pe ratio n, Jet alon e un der take o ne. until afte r NATO has d ecid ed to not in volve itself in the same area .
Thu s, it appea rs that NATO has a dcjacto, bu t defmitelv no t dejure, right o f'firsr refu sal, th o ug h N ATO co nc re te ly and und isp uredl y reta ins the right to refuse th e use o f its assets by th e EU. W he n raking into accou n t th e very likely sce nario th at th e EU wo uld he unable to m ou n t an effective ope ratio n except wit h re co urse to N AT O assets. th is effectively gives NATO and , sign ifIcantly, no n-E U N ATO me m ber s, a ve to over the o pe ratio n. The qu estio n of ,1 d(' .«We> versu s a de ju re right is imp ortant to co nsid er in ligh t of th e fact th at all state me nts and Jg ree n le nts o n EU-NAT O co operatio n are not legally bin d ing und er inrc rna rio nal law , that is, th ey have not bee n w ritte n int o J ny form aI treaties o r agrccmcuts. T hey have sim ply bee n laid o ut piec em eal i ll p ress releases. co m m u niques, and in th e case of th e Berlin Plu s agr eeme nts th em selves, w hat .u u o uu t to " ex ec utive agreem en ts" between th e NATO Secr etarv -Cener al and the EU Hi gh R epresentative fo r C FSP51 Thus, the state me nts and ag reelll enrs are o n ly di plo m at ically bin di ng in that it w ill be politically d ifficult fo r either o rgan izatio n to act co nt rary to w hat it had previo usly stated in on e of th e abo veme nt ion ed wa ys.
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III.C POST-BERLIN PLUS MILITARY OPERATIONS
III.Cl. Background
It l1l<ly be helpful In <In opaque analysis (due to classification of relevant documents) of the Berlin Plus agreements to briefly analyze several military operations undertaken by the involved actors, including both operations by the EU not conducted under Berlin Plus but conducted independently after the conclusion of the agreement, and operations by the EU considered but ultimately not conducted at all, It is first necessary, however, to mention the NATO operations in FYROM, Operations Essential Hnrvcst, Amber Fox, and /lllicd Harnuntv, as background for the later EU operations. These operations were tasked with the disarmament of ethnic Albanian groups and the destruction of their weapons. This necessarily involved ground forces, the overwhelming majority of which were contributed by European NATO members. with the UK being the "lead" nation and the United States only providing logistical support. This was basically an example of the "separable but not separate" capabilities envisioned in the Saint-Malo agreement: a "European operation under the NATO fl<lg,"" .md a logical step not only on the W,ly to renlOvlllg the WEU from a direct link between NATO and the EU, but also to the h.mdover of nearly all operations 1!l FYROM from NATO to the EU.
III.C2. Post-Berlin Plus Military Operations: Concordia
The European Council felt that ESDP was well-developed enough to take over operations in FYROM from NATO, while still using NATO assets, in 2002, but was in Jgreement that Berlin Plus should be finalized beforehand, which occurred on March 17, 2003 with the aforementioned exchange of letters. \< Concordia began on March 31. The operation was undertaken within the Berlin Plus framework and allowed the EU to take direct control of NATO assets, Its main task was to continue to ensure the implementation of the Ohrid Fr.unework Agreement between ethnic Albanians and FYROM forces. Command of the operation had already been held by the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands while it W<lS under the command of NATO, and the EU desired continuity in this area."
Command of Concordia was structured, JS Berlin Plus envisioned, with the Deputy SACEUR, a European, as the operation commander and the operation headquarters <It NATO's AFSOUTH (now known asJFC Naples) 1!l Italy, with an EU chain of command following from there. The EU force could call for backup or relief at any time which would have been provided by KFOR Rear, <I NATO force, which remained in FYROM for a variety of reasons, not the least of which W<lS that the Maccdonian public had an existing relationship with and trust in NATO, which had made a point of mounting regulJr, visible, and heavilv-armed patrols m the country during its operations. This continuity of presence and operational linkage W,IS necessary for the EU's mission to be successful."
Concordia was generally judged to be a success and ended in December 2003 after havlllg been extended past its original end date by three months following an upsurge in violence In the [Ill. It was followed by a civilian (but still ESDP) police mission, EUPOL Proxima, which reflected J more general trend in the Balkans from a need for direct military peacekeeping to a need for militarized civilian law enforcement. The highest-ranking dual-hatted officer at JFC Naples was the Chief of Staff, who simultaneously acted as the JFC Naples Chief of Staff and the EU Command Element Chief of Staff,,7 Likely in part due to this dual-hatted post, the main problem with Concordia was seen as the questionable NATO, the European Union, and European Defense After Cold War autonom y o f th e EU Comm and Element atJFC Naples, w h ich wa s su p pos ed to be able to indepe nd entl y fo rm u lare an d give o rd er s to th e E U fo rc es. This ma y have had som ethi ng to do w it h th e fac t that u nd er B erl in P lus, the op e rati o nal co m m and er is ge ne rally the D eputy SAC EU R., w ho fu nc tio ns in a " d ual-h atred " rol e as b o th th e NAT O D ep u ty SACEUR and th e EU o pe ra tio n con uu ander ." COl/cordia also did not resolve the q ue stio n o f the existen ce of a rig h t o f fi rst refusal. b ec ause th e ope ratio n was a tak eo ver fro m N ATO , not a situati o n w h ere both NAT O and t h e EU h ad p o te ntia l in teres t in cond u c ti ng a n e w o pe ration. T h e co nstant presen ce o f K FO R Rear also raises questions abo ut t h e ability at th e tim e of th e E U fo rce to deal w it h an y unforese en sev e re pr oblem. Th is e ncouraged th e E U to act as n o t o n ly a test of it s capa bilities but as a de mon stratio n th at it was ab le to do so indep e nd e ntl y. Second, th e U S wa s very unli k el y to ag ree to a N A T O -supported inte rvention in Africa after its di sastrou s interventi on in So m alia III 19Y3 and its refusal to m rerve ue in Lib e ria ea rlie r in 20 03 . Britain and Fran ce , o n t h e o t he r h an d, h ad in de p e n den tl y inte rvened in Afr ica in 2000 a nd 2 002 a nd we re conti nui n g b o th to stre ngt he n Eu rop ean d efens e capab iliti es and coo pe ratio n o n sec urity in A frica and to heal th e rift b et w e en EU m e mbers o ver th e Ira q Wa r. u ) Pr e para tio ns fo r A neinis minimi zed t he NATO-E U relati o nship. Initiall y pla n n ed ,IS a purel y French operati on , n either Fran ce n or the EU m ade an y re q u est fo r co ns u ltatio n w it h NATO at least as far as public reco rds sho w . all o ppo rtuni ty to co nsid e r (and ult im atel y n:ien) p.rrnc ip.u ron , it likel y w o uld hav e had tro ub le d efe lldi ng its d cri sio u to o p pose th e unde rt ak in g o t-w hat "',IS esse n rially a hum .ur ir.rri.u: o pera tio n Clearly . th e EU did no t in te rpre t ,lilY \;ght o f tirsr refusa l as one " w he re th e all ia nce as~l w ho le has d ecid ed 1l0l1O be e llg;lged." becau'l' it h.rd 1I0t b rou ght all Yproposals to N ATO tor its refusal before co n u n c uci n g the operati on .
1II.C.3. Post-Berlin Plus Military Operations: Artemis
III ;1 pr e" conferen ce foll o wing the s('" io n, Se cr er ar y-C cu erul Lord Rob ertson stated th at " N ATO wo ul d 1I 0t want co be e llg;lged " be cau se NA TO 's st rategi c interests were e lsew here . A m em ber of th e Secrerary-Ceucrals stafT, howe ver. w as 1II 0re candid in h is remarks when h e stated th at the y were " d isturbed" b y Fran ce 's plann ing m eth o d ol og y, c1ailll ing that France had in itially ca lled for an " in reruatio na l fo rce 0 11 th e bas is of a 'coal itio n of th e wi lling .' [a CJ T F] th en pla nt ed the Euro pea n Hag ove r it. H o w 1I0t to conside r it as a d clihc rate plan to shortc u t th e ' pc n u une ut arrangcll lc nts' [Berl in Plus] agTeed between N AT O and th e Eu ro pe an Uni on ?":" T h e o pera tio n was fu rther criticized ,IS a " Fre nc h opera tio n w it h an EU cover" du e to the ex tre m e ly high prop o rtion o f Fre nc h troop co n tri b u tion ami ex te nsive Fre ncli planning ; nea rly six ty percent of the staff o f the operati on h eadqua rt ers we re Fr e nch ofhcc rs."' D espite these cri ticism s. th e o pera tion was succ essful ly ca rr ied out an d the pla n ne d ESD i> framewo rk fu nc tio ned as inrc nded . with th e EU Pol itical and Secu rit y C on nni rrec exe rc ising full politi cal .m d strategi c con tro l at all rim es. It w as not. h o w e ver. a d em o nstrati o n o f trul y uni ver sally iude peudeu r ESDi> m ilirary ca pa bility . as th e EU req uired m o re st rate gic uirlifr than was av ai lable fro m E U mem be rs, Th is nc ccssirarcd th e co nr n bu rio us of ai rlift capabilirv by Brazilian and Ca nad ian aircr aft, as w e ll as le dsed Russian ,Iircr aft' " (co be t:lir to th e EU, the U S also occasio n ally lease s R ussian aircr.rfr to condu ct its inde pe nden t m ilita ry o pe ratio ns du e to a LI ck of n eeded Clp~lCi ry). " " ,4 "'('/111" Illay dem onstrat e t he .ihili ty o f the EU to mr crvcu e ill places N AT O cann ot or d o cs not w ish to go.
/II.C.4. The Moldovan Non-Operation
Finall y. tlu-rc wa s an iu cid en r su rr o u nd ing a po ssibl e EU iutervent io n in M ol d o va III 1(l().l . Sin ce th e b rea kaw ay " T ra nsn istrian Repu blic" cla imed a portion of M o ldo va 's territo ry in I \)\)(), the regi on had be en a so ur ce of in stabi lit y and cr ime, bur not lar ge -selic viol e nce. Still. it appears t ha t all ES O P o p tio ns w e re co ns idered by th e EU Politi cal and Security Conuuirrce , in clu d in g a police unssiou . all ind ep end ent military mis sion, .md ;1 B erlin Plu s military mi ssion . T he Berlin Plus military nii ssio n was initiall y co nsid er ed to b e th e mos t flvo rable path , but d isc ussio ns with NATO led to the United States " vc he m e u tlv rej e ct in g" th e id ea of an in d e pen d ent ESDP mi ssio n and f:lvo ring a B erlin Plus o per atio n . After the su m m e r of 10(l3, the m utter d ropp ed otT t he age lllb of th e EU and it has since restricted in vol vem ent iu Moldova to diplom.uic .uri virv .m d a bo rd e r-m on ito rin g m issio n se n t on t he j o int re q uest of t he Moldovan and Ukra inia n govc rn lllents .,,7
It is difficult to di scern w hethe r or not th is w as an insta uce of N AT O exercising a rig h r o f firsr refusal. Ne ither th e EU nor N ATO p ro ceeded w ith any action co nce rn ing Moldova aftl'r the aforem enti on ed di scussio ns betw ee n th e Politi cal and Securi ty Co m m ittee and th e Nort h Atlantic Co u nci l. Si n ce it call be argu ed th at a n ght of fir st refusal mu st be exer cise d h y the n ght hold er su bseq ue n tly Ktin g o n th e p ro posal itself. the res ul t is th at this particu -LI r case is inconclu sive and that N AT O co n tiu ues to have suc h a rig h t o nl y in th e form of d e ny iug ;lCCl',S to cr ucia l capabilities for a n operati o n .
III.C.S. Interlude: The EU States Its Preferences For Future Operations
In Dece m b er 2()()3, til e European Co u n c il rel eased an uup ort.mt doc u me n t ou tli n in g its pre fe rences for N AT O -E U n iilitarv co o peration . Entitled " E u ro p ean D efeuce: NATO I E U Consu ltation, 1)l anllillg and O pera tio ns ," it o ut lines th e ELI' s pr efer en ces fo r mili r.rry operati ons In a hi era rcliical fls hio n . It IS im po rta nt to no te t hat NATU W;IS not invo lve d in th e dr; \fi: in g o f th is do tu u ie nr. :" Tlie d OCUIII l'llt presents fo ur o p t io ns , in o rder o f p refe rcn rc o f use: fi rst, th e EU prefers a NATO-lcd c.n u p.ugn wit h no indepen dent EU cle me n t . This Illa y in d ica te t he E U 's tacit acce ptance 01' ;1 right of fi rst refusal by NAT O , hut it d o es not sp ec ifically say so. Tli e secon d op tio n IS an E U -Ied o perat io n un d er th e p olitical and strateg ic co n t ro l of th e Politic.rl and Se n ili ty Co u u u itree, usin g NAT O plannill g f lc ilit ies and assets, This is a B erlin Plus-ty p e o p e ra tio n . Third , the EU p re fe rs an in d e pe nd e nt opera t ion wi thou t recou rse to NATO assets, with an EU me m be r state act ing as a le ad ing " fr.un ew o rk nation " . The lea st preferabl e o ption is an inde pen de nt o pera t io n sim ilar to th e third op tio n b u t with th e EU Military St;lff (;1 m ilitary h od y atta ch ed to the offi ce of th e Hi gli R epresentati ve for C FS P) acting as the lead unit .?" C lea rly th ere is~l prefe ren ce and assum ption 0 11 the part o f the E U that it w ill w o rk clo sel y wi th NATO d u ri ng th e ini t ial ph ases of planning In ope ratio n in o rd e r to d et e rmi ne
if th e fir st o p t io n is feas ih le . NATO':; respo nse to th e docum ent , as o u tli ne d in Secre taryGen eral R o be rtson 's comm ents. was o ne o f gene ral agr ee illent, hut depar te d from th e E U 's bllgu age in t w o im po rt au t ar eas . First, Instead of o nly th e seco n d opti on b e in g 111 th e purvie w of t he Berlin Plu s agree me n ts, it ad d it io na lly placed o p tio ns th ree a n d four "wit hin the con tex t" of Berl in PIll' . T h is app ears to have b e en ,111 attem p t by NATO 1101' to co-o p t, hut at leas t to in sert a remin d er into E U -centn c o pe ra t io ns t ha t it remain ed th e EU's " first cho ice " sec ur ity prov ide r. Secon d , th e re w as di sag r eement wit h Ian gtl age reLltillg to a right of tirst refusal. T he EU 's dor um c nt sta le d it w ould undertak e non -NAT O -l ed opera tio ns " w here NATO as a w ho le is not cng;lged," whil e N ATO re p hrase d it as "w here N ATO as a w h o le has dec id e d n or to he enguged ," n earl y ident ical to th e U S languagt' o n th e m att er as described a bove . H ere , w h ile th e E U's langu age is in d et erm in ate~I S to NATO's rig ht o f firs t re fusa l. NATO states it dea rl y, thus th e d isagreem ent over th e ex iste nce of th e right. NATO b eli e ves it to be a matte r o f fact and the EU is not certai n ; whe n t he su bject is di scu ssed at bot h o rg uu izu t io n s. di ffe rent langu age is used w h ich refl e cts thei r respectiv e vie w poi u ts.?" Th e EU do cu me n t is not legaUy bi n ding 7I and am oun ts to a dec lar atio n by th e EU of its preferen ces fo r cooperation (o r n on-coope ration) w ith NATO , th ough it wo ul d b e d iffi cult to d efen d~I sit ua tio n in w h ic h t he EU viola ted t h is o rd er of p re fe re nce afte r th e rel ea se of th e d o cum ent . The f;ln that the third and fourth o ptio ns a re m cnri on ed ;11' all, and esp e ci ally III th e sallie d o cu m ent as an o pt io n w h ere N ATU co nd uc ts an operation it sel f
In cr eases the likel ih ood th at they will be pursu ed an d impli es t h at th e task o f Eu rop ean cri sis
In an ;lgelll en t IS, in th e VIew of I'h e E U . sh iftillg away from N ATO to itself
."! rl l'l ll is roo k p lace before th e EU released the aboveme ut io ned d o cum ent o u tlini ng its p re fer ences for the fo rm.n o f mil itary o p e ratio ns . II' IS possib le rh .n the doc u m ent was, in part, rel eased to reas s ure N ATO th at it would n ot , in th e' future. ign o re' its conuuitments to ea rly co nsu ltat io n during th e pla nn ing phases o f an o pera t ion . as it had don e in the cas e of A rtctu!» . 5 . US involvement In BiH had been hcsir.mr thro ug ho u t NATO 's co n m u n uc n ts there . as it had never bee n a spec ific security con cern o f th e U S (apa rt Irom gcneral Eu rop ean sta bility co nc e rns) , th ou gh th ere was d sm.rll uiea sure o f concern ove r stc u u n ing possibl e Iranian influen ce th ere .
7 \ As with COl/cordia, European state s, m o st sig n ific an tly Fran ce an d th e UK, w ere th e m ain troop co u rrib utors to NATU's previ ou s mi ssion as they had also [we n in the UN mi ssion in 13iH as w ell.
NATO had pr evi ou sly judged an EU tak eo ver o f S FO R ill 20n ..j to he premature . hut o nce Genu.my j oined all Anglo-French p rop o sal to take over SFUR in late 2lJOl and the EU d eclared it self " ready " to do so, NAT O w as m oved to agree in prin ciple-that a takeo ve r h y the EU co uld happ en . All parti es ag ree d th at to ensure continuity o f presence, the E U mi ssion wa s to be cond ur te d und er B erlin Plu s. hut also that NAT U wo u ld m.unr.uu a headquarters th er e and re ser ve so me part, o f SF O R 's mi ssion for itself: speci fiedly , th e co n tin u ing hunt fo r w ar rriui iuuls in Bil-i, milirary rcf orm , and prep aring the co u u rry for participuri on in the Pa rt ne rshi p for [)cace pr ogram ." NATO also ne ed ed to mainrain ;1 prese nce ill BiH. ;IS o ne co u u uc n taro r put it , be cau se th e local populati on did not trust th e EU to protect them, and that the Europeans w er e "th e ones who sat th er e and did nothiug fo r four years while th e y we re slaughtered . .. land ;JS it had been the p rinci pa l ar ch it ect of th e politi cal peace in BiH , if not th e milit.uv pex e . The emphasis o n a Ber lin Plus m ission was ;1 W ;IY fo r th e U S to allay Congressio nal skc pricism that th e EU w ould he able to d o NATO \j oh in BiH an d fears t hat th e U S w as slow ly being excluded fro m European security. Again , ;IS with Con conli«, rile D eputy SACEUP, ac ted as th e o pera tion co u u u und c r, but thi s tim e the operational h eadqu art ers was located at S H A PE . Aulu:a w as a lar ger-scale test for Berlin Plus, and so t i l' has been successful in th at there hav e be en no m ajor hang-ups in NAT O -EU cooperation . Th e o pe ratio n is on go in g as o f April 2000 . As m curi oned above . th e E U has also be e n a be tt e r c ho ice to de al with th e shift from a n eed for milita ry pe acek eep ing to militarized law e n fo rce me nt , and from largescale violen ce to organ ize d and fill an ci;d cri me ;IS it is m ore able to d eplo y civ ilian poli ce missions. " NAT O is not ;1 law e nforce me n t o rga ni zatio n and ca n not re adil y dra w o n law enforcement per sonnel the way th e EU C U I. lu tlet . concerns ;lIno n g EU m ember s th at the EU military fo rce sho uld not be involved in law enforcement in BiH led to the dcpl o vm cu r of the EU Poli n ' Mi ssion to coordin ate ESDP assistance to BiH police instead of going throu g h th e mil it ary force.'7 A lthea cam e clos er to re sol vin g th e q uestio n of a right o f first re fusa l. The EU did not o ffic ially d ecl ar e its interest in J mi ssion in Bo sni a unt i] N ATO a n no u nced that it w ould rcrunnare SFO R in 2004. 1 " T h is wa it in g peri od likel y held up E U planning o f a mi ssio n in BiH until NATO urmo u nced it w as ame nab le to an EU tak eo ver. Tins nrav again indicat e tacit EU acceptan ce of NATO's right ;1, int erp ret ed by th e "where th e alliance ;IS ;1 w ho le NATO, the European Union, and European Defense After Cold War is n ot c ng aged" phLI \in g . as NA T O w as n ot e ng; lged in . and in ( IC t. had just dis en gag ed from til l' cap ;Kit il'S tile EU assu med w he n / 1/(/(('1! W;lS laun ched . N everthel ess, Althcn d cmonsrrarcd closer NATO-EU cooperation at all level s. .md show ed rh.ir th e NATO -EU relati on ship is st ro ng a nd fu nct io nal.
IV. CONClUSION
Thu s Wl' h ave see n that there ar e Ind eed difTerlll g o p lillo ns o n the exis te n ce o f rights acc o rd ed to NATO under its a~'Te elll elltS w it h the European Uni on . It is unlikel y that we will kn ow tor ce rt ain of th e e xi ste nce O L I right o f fir st refu sal until a n e w con flict arises ill all ar ea w h ere both NATO and the E U wish to take acti on . Even if su ch a situation d o es arise, becau se 110 right is co ucrc tc ly e nsh rine d in a ny publicl y av a ilable do c n me n t. it lIl;lY be that NATO and th e EU wiJl sim p lv negotiate ;IS to w hic h o rg an iza tio n w ill he the one to tak e acti on. This p o ssibility is indicative of a gr eat er trend ill NATO-EU relations afrer Berlin
Plus towards o p en ncss . dipl oma cy , .m d politi cal pragmari sm b et w een th e t w o organi zations . We ha ve also see n that there ha s be en a clear pro gression o f the NA TO-EU niilira ry relati onship th at required spec ific act io n on bo t h m embers to 1l10 VC forward; th e rel ationship h .is not been subj ect to circum stance o r expedi ence. M ore over. we have seen that durillg o perat io ns conducted between the two o rga n izatio ns . e ve n ts pr o gressed smoo thly .uid bo th NATO and th e EU exe rte d significant effo rt to wo rk co o pe rati vel y and suc cessfull y in pursuit o f COil 1111 011 goals. In more th.m on e instanc e. the EU ack n o w le dged th e ne c essit y of keeping N ATO directl y in volved ill th e E u ro p ea n sec u rit y ar ea , and co nv ersel y . the indivi sibili ty of ou r secunrv and our neterrrunat io n to t ack le t he cnauenocs o f the ne w Cent u ry ; • Welcome th e continued im port an t ro le of NATO in cris is m anagemen t lind wnmet preventio n, lind reillfi rm tha t NATO r ema ins the founda t io n of t he col lective defe nce of its me mbers; • Welcome t he European Security anel Defence Policy ( ESOP), whose pu rpose Is to add to the range of Ins tr umen t s alre3l1y at t he Euro pean Un io n 's d isposa l to r , ri5i~manaqe ment an d co nrlic.t prev e nt io n in su pper of t he Common r ore,g and seconrv Polley, th e capacit y to conduct EU-led cr isis man agemen t ope rations, incl Udi ng mi li tary operations where NI\ TO as a whole is not engage d ; • Reaffirm t hat a stronger European ro le will help contribut e to th e Vit ali ty of t he All ia nce, specifica lly In t he fiel d of cri sis manaocmcnt:
• Reaffirm their det er m in ation to strenqtnen their caoeorunes:
Declare that the relationship between the Eur opean Union and NATO w ill be founded on the fo llowi ng pr i nciples :
• Pc" l llt::1~l l iV .~II.~U ' illL" l h a l I h~l.I i~~1I Id ll n l/t"II I't:' lI l dl,. li v i t i t::~vr li lt::: l n v orq amsa no n s are mu tu all y r eintorc m q, wh ile recognising th at the Europea n Un io n and NATO are organisation s of a diffe r"nt nature ;
• Effect ive mu tua l consu lta tio n, dia logue, coo perat ion an d t ra nsparen cy ; • Equality and du e regard fo r t he dec isio n-mak ing aut onom y an d
II1le r" " ls of t he Eur op,M Il Un ion and NATO; • Respect for the mte rest s of tI e Mem bE'1 States of the European Uni on and NA 0;
• RE'spect for th e pr tnctote s of th e Char t er of t he Un it ed Nations, wh ich underlie the Tr eaty on Eur opean Un ion and the Washingt on Treat y, in orde r to prov ide one of t he mcrs pensetne foun dat ions fo r a st a ble Euro-Attart t ic secu rity env ironment , based on the commit ment to t he peaceful resolu t io n of disputes . In which no country wou ld be ab te t o inti midat e or coe rce any ot her th rough th e threat o r use of force , an d also based on respect tor treat y righ ts and Obliga t ions as w!!11 as re fr aining fr om un ila ter al acti ons ; • Cohere n t, tr ansparen t and m utually re inforcing developm ent of t he mi lit ary capabili ty req uir ements com mon to the t wo organisa tions ;
To t is end :
• I he Euro pean Un ion Is ensur i ng th e full est oossr ble Invo lvem ent of non-EU European members of NATO wit hin ESDP, im plE' me nt ing he relevant NIce arr angeme nts , as set out In tne lett e r from t he EU~lig l l Represe ntat iv e on 13 December 2 002 ;
• NA a is support inq ESOP in accorden ce wi th the relevant Washington Summ it decision s, and I S Qlv ing the European umon, inter ali a and in part icula r, assured access to NATD 's pla nning capabilit ies, as set out in the !lAC oeo sic ns 0 <1 13 oecember 200 2;
• Bot h orqa rusanons have rccoqn tscd t h e nee d for a rrangemen ts to e nsu re t he co herent, transpa re n t and rnut ally rei nforci n g de ve lo pment o f t he c apa bl lit v r eq uire m en t s common \0 t he two organ isa t ions. wi th a SPirit of o pen ne ss.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/8 whe re "';,\ TO a ., whole j-, nor e n~il~c,l. the EI. 1 . In undcnakinp a n opcrtuion, will d ,no'-C whether or no l 10 h:l\ c rcl , :our.-oc ro , 'J ATo a'"c ' '' an,1 capahiliric», t.ak lJ1~m in~1~'(,:mlll l to particular the Alli.mc ·' s role , l·Jp. ; .l\. ·itic..... a nd invo lvement in the rC t lt Hi in t.I U~l-l i{l ll. n'~1 1 prnl..'c~", will be co nd ucted thr o ug h Ih l..' " Berli n pl u-, " ....nan~l.: n ll: n t. ' . In o rder tp IlHpro v e the p re parat ion 01-E ll o pe ra tion .. ha Vln~rr cOll hl". · 10 '\l:\T U i' '''M'h a nd ca pabi lu ic-, und er Hcr h n pin' urrange mcnts. we pr" p" '" rhal :, , ,,,,,I I Fl ' c ell sho uld be c ' la hli, lll'd ;\ . ....i-.t NATO, the European Union, and European Defense After Cold War gc vcrn.i11ce-/ e,l S-t he-en rop ca n-un io 11-horde r-a ssistau ce-missiou-eu ball I NATO, the European Union, and European Defense After Cold War
